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INTRODUCTION 
Law and rhetoric have always been connected. Their roots go back to the 
Classical period wherein facility in law and rhetoric were necessary citizenship 
skills for advocacy in the polis.1 As a result, instruction in rhetoric and law 
went hand in hand. Over time though that close connection began to wane as 
forces like religion began to replace rhetoric as a primary discourse source, 
which ultimately resulted in law and rhetoric viewed as separate rather than 
 
*  Mark A. Hannah is an Associate Professor of English at Arizona State University. Susie 
Salmon is the Director of Legal Writing and Clinical Professor of Law at the University of 
Arizona. 
1  Malthon Anapol, Rhetoric and Law: An Overview, 18 COMM. Q. 12, 12 (1970); see also 
GEORGE A. KENNEDY, CLASSICAL RHETORIC & ITS CHRISTIAN & SECULAR TRADITION FROM 
ANCIENT TO MODERN TIMES 4 (2d ed. 1999); Linda Levine & Kurt M. Saunders, Thinking 
Like a Rhetor, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 108, 110 (1993). 
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mutually informing disciplines.2 Of late, there have been efforts to restore law 
and rhetoric’s close connection in legal education.3 A primary focus of these 
efforts was to provide lawyers tools and vocabulary to recognize the value and 
potential application of rhetoric in their work.4 These efforts have been success-
ful in establishing rhetoric’s value in improving the development of lawyers’ 
reasoning and writing skills, yet they do not offer a comprehensive account of 
rhetoric in law. More specifically, rhetoric has been brought back to law only in 
part through descriptive practice and application of well-known rhetorical con-
cepts such as ethos, pathos, and logos as well as through efforts to articulate 
writing as a process and attend to audience, purpose, and context.5 What has 
been missing from the restorative efforts is attention to some of rhetoric’s more 
complex concepts that demonstrate rhetoric’s constitutive capacity and how it 
creates and shapes conditions for action in everyday life. We argue that such 
attention to these complex concepts is an important step towards expanding and 
strengthening law and rhetoric’s close connection. 
In this Article, we make the case for dissent writing and reasoning as the 
vehicle for fully restoring rhetoric and law’s connection. We see dissents as su-
perior tools for talking about and examining the close relationship between law 
and rhetoric, because as a genre, dissents invite working with and closely scru-
tinizing law’s systemic nature, its inherent instability and uncertainty, and the 
surpluses that emanate from legal texts as they work their way through law’s 
system.6 Rather than seeing such instability and uncertainty as barriers to effec-
tive communication, rhetoric sees these items as fruitful resources for develop-
ing reasoning and effective advocacy.7 Put simply, dissents make visible rheto-
 
2  Anapol, supra note 1, at 15. 
3  See sources cited infra notes 10, 21, 23, 25, and 26. 
4  Kristen K. Robbins-Tiscione, A Call to Combine Rhetorical Theory and Practice in the 
Legal Writing Classroom, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 319, 319 (2011). 
5  Michael H. Frost, With Amici Like These: Cicero, Quintilian and the Importance of Stylis-
tic Demeanor, 3 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 5, 9 (2006) [hereinafter Frost, Stylistic 
Demeanor]; Kristen Robbins Tiscione, Aristotle’s Tried and True Recipe for Argument Cas-
serole, 15 PERSPS.: TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 45, 48 (2006) [hereinafter Tiscione, 
Aristotle]; Kristen K. Tiscione, How the Disappearance of Classical Rhetoric and the Deci-
sion to Teach Law as a “Science” Severed Theory from Practice in Legal Education, 51 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 385, 391 (2016) [hereinafter Tiscione, Disappearance]. 
6  LIEF H. CARTER & THOMAS F. BURKE, REASON IN LAW 86–87 (9th ed. 2016); JAMES BOYD 
WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 237 (Abridged ed. 1985); Marie-Claire Belleau & Rebecca 
Johnson, Ten Theses on Dissent, 67 U. TORONTO L.J. 156, 165 (2017). 
7  Kristine M. Bartanen, The Rhetoric of Dissent in Justice O’Connor’s Akron Opinion, 
SOUTHERN SPEECH COMM. J. 240, 244 (1987); Linda L. Berger, Studying and Teaching “Law 
as Rhetoric”: A Place to Stand, 16 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 3, 7 (2010) [hereinafter Berger, 
Studying]; Robert L. Ivie, Enabling Democratic Dissent, 101 Q.J. SPEECH 46, 46 (2015); 
Erin J. Rand, Fear the Frill: Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the Uncertain Futurity of Feminist 
Judicial Dissent, 101 Q.J. SPEECH 72, 76 (2015). 
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ric’s constitutive nature as a discipline that fundamentally creates and invents 
rather than merely adorns.8 
Admittedly, working with dissents may seem counter-intuitive to readers; 
after all, dissents are legally impotent at the time of their composition. They 
represent anti-majority reasoning and work against the grain of the majority 
opinion. As such, in the moments following their creation, dissents have con-
strained potential as precedents for shaping law.9 However, it is in this very 
space of working against the grain that dissents’ promise lies for reestablishing 
rhetoric and law’s close connection. When examining dissents, we argue that 
law students are exposed to the complex rhetorical concepts that create condi-
tions for a dissent’s future success. As such, dissents are unique discursive tools 
for heightening and making visible rhetoric and law’s close connection across 
the law school curriculum. 
I. WHY RHETORIC? 
Although rhetoric seems to be at the heart of the lawyer’s craft—after all, 
using communication to persuade is the lawyer’s stock in trade—rhetoric often 
receives very little explicit attention in the law school curriculum. Modern legal 
educators often implicitly teach rhetoric but fail to do so intentionally or ex-
pressly.10 This disconnect is not a new development; the relationship between 
rhetoric and legal education long has been a turbulent one. In the Classical pe-
riod in Greece and Rome, lawyers studied rhetoric along with “law, politics, 
history, poetry, and oratory.”11 Indeed, “in Greece[,] theories of rhetoric were 
developed largely for speakers in the lawcourts . . . .”12 Over the years, howev-
er, education in rhetoric shifted away from analyzing how to devise and con-
struct a sound, logical argument and evolved instead to focus largely on style 
and delivery.13 
Against this historical background, U.S. legal education faced a fork in the 
road at the end of the 1800s.14 Curricula at many of the first U.S. law schools 
included explicit instruction in rhetoric.15 Legal educators valued training in 
 
8  See Amanda C. Bryan & Eve M. Ringsmuth, Jeremiad or Weapon of Words?, 4 J.L. & 
CTS. 159, 161 (2016). 
9  See Bryan & Ringsmuth, supra note 8, at 161; J. Louis Campbell, III, The Spirit of Dis-
sent, 66 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 304, 306 (1983); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Role of Dis-
senting Opinions, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1, 4 (2010). 
10  See Leigh Hunt Greenhaw, “To Say What the Law Is”: Learning the Practice of Legal 
Rhetoric, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 861, 861 (1995); Levine & Saunders, supra note 1, at 109. 
11  See Tiscione, Disappearance, supra note 5, at 391–92. 
12  KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 4–5. 
13  Levine & Saunders, supra note 1, at 110 (“The separation of law from rhetoric occurred 
during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance at about the same time that rhetoric came to 
mean the art of oratorical eloquence distinct from the science of logic and dialectic.”). 
14  Id. at 111. 
15  Id. at 110. Students at Columbia Law School, for example, read Plato, Aristotle, and Cice-
ro. Id. 
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rhetoric, urging law students to become familiar with its principles and practic-
es.16 Notably, in the late 1800s, Yale Law School was moving toward a more 
practical model of legal education, animated by a rhetorical theory of lawyer-
ing.17 At the same time, however, the Langdellian revolution hit Harvard; law 
schools began to see law as an empirical science comprised of concrete and 
certain rules susceptible to discovery through the rational, systematic analysis 
of court opinions.18 Under the Langdellian model, rhetoric, with its focus on 
persuasion and probability rather than discovery of the one true law, became 
viewed as nonrational—a “failed science”—and antithetical to the goals of the 
method.19 The “case method” quickly dominated legal pedagogy, and Yale’s 
approach—and its explicit instruction in rhetorical theory and methods—
virtually disappeared from law school curricula for the next hundred-plus 
years.20 
In recent years, however, legal scholars—in particular, legal-writing schol-
ars—have exhorted legal educators to revive explicit instruction in rhetorical 
theory and practices across the law school curriculum.21 Teaching students to 
recognize the inextricable relationship between rhetoric and law can only en-
rich their understanding and appreciation of law and the lawyer’s role. Law 
isn’t, in fact, a hard science. “True law” is no concrete entity that students can 
discover through investigation but the product of fallible humans engaged in 
and influenced by persuasive techniques.22 Making transparent the rhetorical 
nature of law can help dissolve many law students’ fixed notions of some 
mythical “ball” of black-letter law that their doctrinal professors are somehow 
“hiding” through the Socratic method.23 Rhetoric also can serve as a unifying 
theory that creates coherence in the law school curriculum and breaks down 
subject-matter silos by drawing clear connections between theory and practice, 
and thus responds to calls in the Carnegie Report and other critiques of con-
temporary legal education for more integrative teaching models.24 
 
16  Id. at 110–11. 
17  Id. at 111. 
18  Id.; Tiscione, Disappearance, supra note 5, at 395–96. 
19  See Levine & Saunders, supra note 1, at 113–14. 
20  Id. at 111. 
21  See, e.g., Berger, Studying, supra note 7, at 7; Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Against 
the Tyranny of Paraphrase: Talking Back to Texts, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 163, 164 (1993); 
Neil Feigenson, Legal Writing Texts Today, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 503, 506 (1991) (book re-
views); Greenhaw, supra note 10, at 861–62, 865–67; Teresa Godwin Phelps, The New Le-
gal Rhetoric, 40 SW. L.J. 1089, 1092 (1986). 
22  See Tiscione, Disappearance, supra note 5, at 395, 397 (quoting Edward Rubin, What’s 
Wrong with Langdell’s Method, and What to Do About It, 60 VAND. L. REV. 609, 636, 649 
(2007)) (“The case method . . . perpetuates the idea that law exists ‘out there’ for [students] 
to discover. . . . Yet law—encompassing statutes, regulations, and judicial decisions—is a 
social construct, and the study of law is ‘the study of human beings, with all the complexity, 
normativity, and subjectivity that this study necessarily implies.’ ”). 
23  See Robbins-Tiscione, supra note 4, at 319. 
24  See Tiscione, Disappearance, supra note 5, at 398–99. 
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Both the benefits and the means of intentional instruction in rhetoric seem 
clearer in the context of the legal-writing classroom. Law students often learn 
persuasive legal writing in their second semesters, and many legal-writing texts 
and curricula incorporate at least some explicit discussion of rhetoric, even if 
just a glancing mention of logos, ethos, and pathos.25 Introducing students to 
Cicero’s six-part arrangement prepares students for the common components of 
a legal brief.26 Instruction in Aristotle’s canons of composition provides stu-
dents with a process for researching, brainstorming, writing, and arguing an ap-
pellate brief.27 Lacing rhetorical theory throughout the traditional legal-writing 
instruction in constructing legal arguments and preparing legal documents 
couches best practices in a context, which likely enhances transfer of learn-
ing.28 An understanding of deductive reasoning and syllogism helps students 
accept more quickly the IRAC/CREAC organizational paradigm taught in most 
legal writing courses, helping erode students’ usual resistance to the constraints 
of what they initially see as a stifling formula, and this acceptance can only 
lead to better, more coherent writing.29 Students likely expect to encounter in-
struction in rhetorical theory in this context,30 and introducing it makes legal 
writing instruction more intellectually stimulating for both professor and stu-
dent.31 
But rhetoric instruction—like writing instruction—truly belongs “across 
the curriculum” in legal education.32 Imagine a Professional Responsibility 
 
25  See, e.g., Barbara P. Blumenfeld, Rhetoric, Referential Communication, and the Novice 
Writer, 9 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC: JALWD 207, 207 (2012) (“Classical rhetoric is a use-
ful and integral part of legal writing instruction at many law schools.”); Robbins-Tiscione, 
supra note 4, at 325 (“My course is structured around Aristotle’s canons of rhetoric.”). For 
example, a number of legal-writing professors across the country routinely use Dr. Martin 
Luther King, Jr.’s Letter from Birmingham Jail to introduce law students to Aristotle’s 
Modes of Persuasion and other principles of Classical rhetoric when they introduce persua-
sive legal writing. See, e.g., Mark DeForrest, Introducing Persuasive Legal Argument via the 
Letter from a Birmingham City Jail, 15 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 109, 110 (2009); Suzanne 
Rabe, Presentation at the Twelfth Biennial Conference of the Legal Writing Institute: From 
Aristotle to Martin Luther King: Using Letter from Birmingham Jail to Teach Aristotle’s 
Three Modes of Persuasion (Atlanta, Ga., June 8, 2006) (on file with author). 
26  E.g., Frost, Stylistic Demeanor, supra note 5, at 9 (“the Greco-Roman six-part structure of 
legal argument has survived virtually intact to the present day.”); Tiscione, Aristotle, supra 
note 5, at 48 (noting that the Rhetorical ad Herennium, a well-known Roman treatise on 
rhetoric, divided argument into six parts that mirror the parts of a typical modern legal mem-
orandum or brief, and that Cicero and Quintillian adopted these parts as well). 
27  See, e.g., Levine & Saunders, supra note 1, at 118–21; Robbins-Tiscione, supra note 4, at 
325–37. 
28  See Robbins-Tiscione, supra note 4, at 319. 
29  Id. at 329. 
30  See id. at 324 (“I find my first-year law students expect me to teach them about logic and 
emotional appeals—two aspects of rhetoric with which they are rarely familiar—because 
they intuit their relevance to legal education.”). 
31  See id. at 327–28. 
32  See, e.g., Levine & Saunders, supra note 1, at 109 (arguing that “[l]egal education will 
benefit by taking a rhetorical approach to teaching students to think like lawyers.”); James 
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class animated by a discussion of ethos, of Cicero’s conception of the effective 
orator as first and foremost a “good man,” and of Quintilian’s recognition that 
the best advocate is the “good and even-tempered person.” Or imagine a doc-
trinal class where the professor transparently addressed the legal texts as re-
sponses to particular rhetorical situations. Many law students struggle with crit-
ical reading, a skill essential to their success in the classroom and the 
profession.33 Early class or orientation sessions animated by the principles of 
New Rhetoric could welcome new law students to this new discourse commu-
nity and make explicit the connections between legal reading and legal com-
munication, perhaps helping students read legal authorities more skeptically ra-
ther than being “seduced” by them.34 
Moreover, weaving explicit instruction in rhetoric throughout the law 
school curriculum can only enhance law-student and lawyer well-being across 
many dimensions.35 Introducing law students to Cicero’s conception of the ef-
fective lawyer as a well-rounded human being encourages students to nurture 
the interests that they brought with them to law school and to develop new 
ones. But perhaps most importantly, encouraging students to see law as a rhe-
torical practice rather than a quest for some essential, definable legal truth em-
powers them and gives them agency. In contrast with the fatalistic views of le-
gal formalism and legal realism, which in their traditional forms suggest that 
“rules” or “politics” inevitably dictate the results of any case, and thus lawyers 
serve as mere conduits for those preordained outcomes, a rhetorical point of 
view sees lawyers as “human actors whose work makes a difference because 
they are the readers, writers, and members of interpretive and compositional 
communities who together ‘constitute’ the law.”36 Instruction in New Rhetoric 
allows students to see their writing not just as a means to communicate infor-
mation, but as a mode for creating knowledge and for deepening their own un-
 
Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life, 
52 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 685 (1985) (“How can it be that law was ever regarded as anything 
but rhetoric?”); see also sources cited supra note 21. 
33  See Debra Moss Curtis & Judith R. Karp, “In a Case, in a Book, They Will Not Take a 
Second Look!” Critical Reading in the Legal Writing Classroom, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 
293, 294 (2005) (observing that, although critical reading is a “core lawyering skill,” many 
law students fail to engage actively with the material they read); Jane Bloom Grise, Critical 
Reading Instruction: The Road to Successful Legal Writing Skills, 18 W. MICH. COOLEY J. 
PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 259, 261–62 (2017) (noting that many incoming law students “have not 
been exposed to the critical reading skills that are necessary for law school success,” alt-
hough studies suggest that “critical reading skills may be key to law school success.”); Car-
olyn V. Williams, #CriticalReading #WickedProblem, 44 S. Ill. U. L.J. 179, 181 (2020) 
(characterizing the lack of critical reading skills among incoming law students as a “wicked 
problem” that all stakeholders in legal education—not just legal-writing professors—must 
recognize and address to promote student success in law school and in the profession). 
34  See Fajans & Falk, supra note 21, at 163. 
35  Exploring this thesis in more depth is outside the scope of this article but fruitful ground 
for a future piece. 
36  Berger, Studying, supra note 7, at 8–9. 
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derstanding.37 Increasing student comfort with the appropriateness of emotional 
appeals—Aristotle’s pathos—may help mitigate some of the ills associated 
with the otherwise logos-dominated legal reasoning in which law students are 
typically indoctrinated.38 Rhetoric arms students with weapons to lawyer “out-
side the box,” and supplies them with tools to challenge and dismantle unfavor-
able precedent to craft solutions for their clients and advocate for changes in 
unjust or outdated legal rules.39 And deepening law students’ understanding of 
rhetoric—enabling them to see it as more than a collection of stylistic tricks 
and instead as the very definition of “thinking like a lawyer” in all its trans-
formative complexity—allows students to rediscover and deploy talents, inter-
ests, values, personal experiences, and other parts of themselves that traditional 
legal education often stifles and devalues.40 Indeed, teaching law as rhetoric 
welcomes law students into a distinctly human endeavor that connects individ-
uals across the boundaries of time and culture.41 
A. Rhetoric in the Law School Classroom Now 
Increasingly—and particularly with the explosion of legal-writing pro-
grams in the last twenty-plus years—explicit instruction in rhetoric has found 
its way back into at least some law school classrooms.42 Many legal-writing 
texts, particularly more advanced ones focused on persuasive technique, incor-
porate explicit references to the lessons of Classical rhetoric.43 And, unsurpris-
ingly, some legal-writing texts introduce students to various rhetorical devices 
and illustrate them with examples from contemporary legal briefs.44 
 
37  See Linda L. Berger, Applying New Rhetoric to Legal Discourse: The Ebb and Flow of 
Reader and Writer, Text and Context, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 155, 156–57 (1999) [hereinafter 
Berger, Applying New Rhetoric]. 
38  See Berger, Studying, supra note 7, at 8 (“In their traditional guises, formalism and real-
ism appear to doom lawyers to lives of ‘quiet desperation’: if ‘rules’ or ‘politics’ compel 
outcomes, the work of lawyers will have little effect. Rhetoric recognizes a constructive role 
. . . [f]rom the rhetorical point of view, . . . lawyers are human actors whose work makes a 
difference . . . .”). 
39  See id. 
40  See id. at 63–64 (“Students appreciate being able to draw upon the things they carried 
with them into law school that they thought were unwelcome in law school.”). 
41  See id. at 64 (“Rhetorical analysis shows us that ‘law is a human exercise; that it is driven 
neither by immutable truths . . . nor by arbitrary whims.’ Isn’t it ironic that after teaching 
students how to think like lawyers, we must remind them that they will be practicing law as 
human beings?”) (citations omitted). 
42  Blumenfeld, supra note 25, at 207 n.1 (observing that “there is a movement to heavily 
integrate rhetoric as the primary focus and structure of legal writing courses.”); see also su-
pra text accompanying notes 21 and 32. 
43  See, e.g., MICHAEL R. SMITH, ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING: THEORIES AND STRATEGIES IN 
PERSUASIVE WRITING 9 (2d ed. 2008); KRISTEN KONRAD ROBBINS-TISCIONE, RHETORIC FOR 
LEGAL WRITERS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ANALYSIS AND PERSUASION 17 (2d ed. 
2009). 
44  See, e.g., ANNE ENQUIST & LAUREL CURRIE OATES, JUST WRITING: GRAMMAR, 
PUNCTUATION, AND STYLE FOR THE LEGAL WRITER 160 (2d ed. 2005). 
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Arguably, principles of New Rhetoric have animated the curricula of most 
legal writing programs since their earliest days; legal-writing professors have 
implemented a process-over-product approach since at least the early 1980s and 
explicitly focus on audience, purpose, and convention.45 Select law schools 
even include entire courses in Law as Rhetoric, often taught by a legal-writing 
professor.46 But, at this point in the history of legal education, any explicit in-
struction in rhetoric seems to remain almost exclusively in the legal-writing 
classroom.47 
B. Dissents in Law and Rhetoric 
Historically, dissent writing produced much anxiety within the legal com-
munity due to expressed concerns about the anticipated costs that dissent writ-
ing would have on legal practice, such as an increase in politicization of courts 
and their decisions, the creation of uncertainty and indeterminacy in law, and a 
diminishment of collegiality between judges sitting on multi-member courts.48 
The fact that dissents are of no legal consequence only underscored much of 
this anxiety.49 Dissents were “loser law,” after all, and were believed to unnec-
essarily disrupt the stability and legitimacy of the legal system.50 However, 
 
45  Berger, Applying New Rhetoric, supra note 37, at 165–66; Robbins-Tiscione, supra note 
4, at 324 (“Legal writing pedagogy today typically accounts for the individual writer’s pro-
cess, the legal audience, and, to some extent, the generative aspects of writing.”). 
46  See, e.g., Berger, Studying, supra note 7, at 7, 15–21 (describing the upper-level elective 
“Law & Rhetoric” course Berger developed and has taught at two different law schools). 
Notably, Berger has the students read and analyze at least one dissent in her course; it ap-
pears that she primarily uses it to illustrate how differing rhetorical choices in the dissent and 
majority opinion enable different outcomes. 
47  Perhaps, as Kristin Tiscione posited back in 2006, this reflects the propensity of doctrinal 
law professors to see themselves as engaged in a search for “truth,” and that they “conceptu-
alize the search for truth as an exclusively philosophical endeavor” rather than at least par-
tially a rhetorical one. Kristen Konrad Robbins, Philosophy v. Rhetoric in Legal Education: 
Understanding the Schism Between Doctrinal and Legal Writing Faculty, 3 J. ASS’N LEGAL 
WRITING DIRECTORS 108, 125 (2006). 
48  Peter W. Hogg & Ravi Amarnath, Why Judges Should Dissent, 67 U. TORONTO L.J. 126, 
134–36 (2017); see also Jeffrey L. Courtright, “I Respectfully Dissent”: The Ethics of Dis-
sent in Justice O’Connor’s Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC Opinion, in WARRANTING 
ASSENT: CASE STUDIES IN ARGUMENT EVALUATION 125 (Edward Schiappa ed., 1995); Mi-
chael Frost, Justice Scalia’s Rhetoric of Dissent: A Greco-Roman Analysis of Scalia’s Advo-
cacy in the VMI Case, 91 KY. L.J. 167, 173 (2002–03) [hereinafter Frost, Rhetoric of Dis-
sent]; Rand, supra note 7, at 81; Melvin I. Urofsky, Mr. Justice Brandeis and the Art of 
Judicial Dissent, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 919, 920 (2012); Diane P. Wood, When to Hold, When to 
Fold, and When to Reshuffle: The Art of Decisionmaking on a Multi-Member Court, 100 
CAL. L. REV. 1445, 1461–63 (2012). 
49  William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 429 (1986) (“dis-
sent[s] [are] . . . a ‘cloud’ on the majority decision . . . .”); Courtright, supra note 48, at 130; 
Rand, supra note 7, at 73. 
50  Bartanen, supra note 7, at 244; Belleau & Johnson, supra note 6, at 165 (Belleau and 
Johnson write “[t]he tension between stability and change, between certainty and respon-
siveness, is one of the great and unavoidable tensions in law.”); Rand, supra note 7, at 79. 
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over time, this anxiety began to wane due in part to shifts in the make-up of 
courts (i.e., more judges willing to dissent).51 Furthermore, lawyers and schol-
ars began reconceptualizing the kinds of work dissents perform (e.g., their be-
ing theorized as acts of institutional disobedience)52 as well as the recognition 
that they can draw more attention, in particular from the media, and speak to 
broader public audiences than majority opinions.53 In both examples, we see 
the legal community begin to recognize dissents as having untapped constitu-
tive potential54 as available means of persuasion, which for the purposes of this 
Article, demonstrates their value as an object of analysis for heightening law 
and rhetoric’s close connection in the contemporary practice of law. 
Before turning our attention to this potential, we want to provide back-
ground information about the “genre of dissent,” or how dissents have been 
theorized and discussed in the fields of law and rhetoric.55 In what follows, we 
discuss dissents’ roles and purposes as well as the nature of dissents’ voices 
and how they address multiple audiences. 
1. Dissents’ Roles and Purposes 
Though they lack formal, legal significance at the time of their composi-
tion, dissents do important work that both affirms the rule of law yet simultane-
ously challenges the law to be better and more responsive to present day facts 
and circumstances. Legal scholars and practitioners have described dissents’ 
work in terms of a duality or as a double gesture. That is, dissents both disrupt 
and affirm, and they serve as a balancing point between stability and change in 
the law.56 To describe the complexity of this dual work in an accessible man-
ner, scholars and practitioners have identified specific roles and purposes that 
dissents serve. For example, dissents have been recognized as playing a safe-
guard role, as holding judges accountable to the rule of law, and as making 
their reasoning and thinking transparent.57 Key features of dissents’ accounta-
bility role are their work in identifying errors,58 demonstrating flaws in reason-
 
51  Ginsburg, supra note 9, at 1–2. 
52  Campbell, III, supra note 9, at 306 (noting that dissents appeal to controlling law). 
53  Bryan & Ringsmuth, supra note 8, at 174–75; Ginsburg, supra note 9, at 6. 
54  Berger, Studying, supra note 7, at 26; Maurice Charland, Constitutive Rhetoric: The Case 
of the Peuple Québécois, 73 Q.J. SPEECH 133, 141 (1987); Ivie, supra note 7, at 47; Rand, 
supra note 7, at 73. 
55  Bartanen, supra note 7, at 242 (noting that dissents have not received much scholarly at-
tention). 
56  Ivie, supra note 7, at 46; Rand, supra note 7, at 73 (explaining that dissents are “of the 
law and in excess of the law . . . .”). 
57  Bartanen, supra 7, at 247; Brennan, Jr., supra note 49, at 430; Sonia Sotomayor & Linda 
Greenhouse, A Conversation with Justice Sotomayor, 123 YALE L.J.F. 375, 376 (2014). 
58  CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS FOUNDATION, 
METHODS AND ACHIEVEMENTS: AN INTERPRETATION 68 (1928). Famously, Chief Justice 
Hughes wrote that dissents are “an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence 
of a future day, when a later decision may possibly correct the error into which the dissent-
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ing,59 and emphasizing perceived limits of the majority decision.60 A less visi-
ble feature of this accountability is how dissents function as “soft threats” dur-
ing the period in which briefs are circulated internally between judges on multi-
member courts before a majority opinion is announced.61 
Concurrent with their accountability function aimed at affirming the rule of 
law, dissents also point the way forward for changing the law and offer instruc-
tion to other courts for pursuing this path.62 In such signaling work, dissents 
function as change agents. Specifically, they are invitations to revision that re-
frame the issue at hand and invite audiences to reimagine other future possibili-
ties for the law.63 The rhetorical force of a dissent’s appeal to the future is its 
creation of discursive space for thinking and writing to occur over time. Such 
space holds open and creates conditions for conversation to remain open, for 
the points of contention to be publicized, and for other non-legal public partici-
pants to contribute to the framing and discussion of the issue at hand.64 
In creating a holding space and maintaining legal uncertainty, dissents in-
tentionally act against law’s desire for stability by inviting into conversation the 
politics that law strives to exclude.65 Through connecting law and policy, dis-
sents seek to exploit the persuasive capacities of non-legal texts and ideas cir-
culating outside of the law’s closed discourse system. In particular, dissents 
draw on these extra-legal discursive resources as vehicles for pointing out in-
congruences or perceived variances between existing law and evolving societal 
 
ing judge believes the court to have been betrayed.” Id.; Bartanen, supra note 7, at 247; 
Brennan, Jr., supra note 49, at 430; Catherine L. Langford, Appealing to the Brooding Spirit 
of the Law: Good and Evil in Landmark Judicial Dissents, 44 ARGUMENTATION & ADVOC. 
119, 119 (2008); Wood, supra note 48, at 1454. 
59  Brennan, Jr., supra note 49, at 430; Frost, Rhetoric of Dissent, supra note 48, at 173. 
60  Brennan, Jr., supra note 49, at 430; Courtright, supra note 48, at 136; Wood, supra note 
48, at 1455. 
61  Marsha S. Berzon, Dissent, “Dissentals,” and Decision Making, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1479, 
1484–87 (2012) (describing the use of soft threats in a process of “adversarial collabora-
tion”); Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., The Importance of Dissent and the Imperative of Ju-
dicial Civility, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 583, 609 (1994); Ginsburg, supra note 9, at 3 (describing 
dissents as an invitation to majority writers “to refine and clarify”). 
62  Bartanen, supra note 7, at 262; Brennan, Jr., supra note 49, at 430; Bryan & Ringsmuth, 
supra note 8, at 162; Courtright, supra note 48, at 136; Frost, Rhetoric of Dissent, supra note 
48, at 173; Michael Kirby, Judicial Dissent, 12 JAMES COOK U. L. REV. 4, 8 (2005); Wood, 
supra note 48, at 1456. 
63  Belleau & Johnson, supra note 6, at 173–74; Campbell, III, supra note 9, at 307; 
Courtright, supra note 48, at 136 (“[D]issenting arguments function rhetorically to engage 
audiences in the consideration of propositions that the dissenter apparently deems worthy of 
public consideration.”) (citations omitted); Katie L. Gibson, In Defense of Women’s Rights: 
A Rhetorical Analysis of Judicial Dissent, 35 WOMEN’S STUD. COMM. 123, 129 (2012); Tiho 
Mijatov, How to Use a Dissent, 9 DISP. RESOL. INT’L 69, 76 (2015); Rand, supra note 7, at 
82; Wood, supra note 48, at 1447 (referring to the process of reimagining as an act of “re-
shuffl[ing]”). 
64  Belleau & Johnson, supra note 6, at 163; Bryan & Ringsmuth, supra note 8, at 160; Rand, 
supra note 7, at 78. 
65  Campbell, III, supra note 9, at 306; Rand, supra note 7, at 73. 
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norms and law’s inability to respond to them.66 Ultimately, in bringing politics 
within the realm of legal discourse, dissents function as a democratic supple-
ment and promote the ideals set forth in the Constitution.67 
2. Dissents’ Voice and Audience Simultaneity 
The defining feature of a dissent’s voice is that it is the voice of an advo-
cate.68 Unconstrained by concerns of comporting with precedent or forwarding 
stability within the legal system, the voice of the dissent initiates change and 
begins a new conversation that sounds a “call for corrective action.”69 In initiat-
ing such change, a dissent’s voice is decidedly deliberative and operates in its 
holding space with an eye to the future.70 When addressing the future and the 
desirability of law’s attendant change, the tone or style of a dissent’s advocacy 
can take on a range of characteristics. For example, the voice has been de-
scribed as emotionally laden,71 yet heroic and prescient.72 Furthermore, it has 
been noted as aspirational in its aim to carve out perceptions of what should be 
through adopting both a skeptical, stipulative position and committing itself to 
directed acts of questioning, interrupting, and advising.73 Together, each of 
these ways of describing the advocacy of the dissent reveals the unique, idio-
syncratic nature a dissent takes on through the motivated perspective of its au-
thor responding to the particular facts and circumstances underlying an unfa-
vorable judicial outcome.74 It is an open and resolute voice, one that does not 
require itself to be harmonized with the voice of the majority opinion.75 How-
ever, to be successful, the advocate’s voice must work to develop some form of 
 
66  Brennan, Jr., supra note 49, at 430, 432; Campbell, III, supra note 9, at 307. 
67  CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 212–13 (2003); Bartanen, supra note 7, 
at 247; Rand, supra note 7, at 77. 
68  Berger, Applying New Rhetoric, supra note 37, at 173 (noting concerns with students de-
veloping their own voices and being able to initiate conversations in their writing); Camp-
bell, III, supra note 9, at 308. Please note in the Implementation section of this article, we 
will discuss the opportunities dissents offer for helping students work through the challenge 
of developing a voice in their writing. Mijatov, supra note 63, at 74; see also Mark K. Os-
beck, What is “Good Legal Writing” and Why Does It Matter?, 4 DREXEL L. REV. 417, 444 
(2012). 
69  Ivie, supra note 7, at 50. 
70  Gibson, supra note 63, at 134; Hogg & Amarnath, supra note 48, at 138; Rand, supra 
note 7, at 77. Please note dissents also have an epideictic function in that they praise and/or 
blame a majority opinion. 
71  Bryan & Ringsmuth, supra note 8, at 161. 
72  ALAN BARTH, PROPHETS WITH HONOR: GREAT DISSENTS AND GREAT DISSENTERS IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 14 (1974); Langford, supra note 58, at 119–20; Mijatov, supra note 63, at 
79; Rand, supra note 7, at 76. 
73  Campbell, III, supra note 9, at 307; Gibson, supra note 63, at 135; Ivie, supra note 7, at 
50; Langford, supra note 58, at 120. 
74  Bartanen, supra note 7, at 245. 
75  See Belleau & Johnson, supra note 6, at 160; Courtright, supra note 48, at 141; Frost, 
Rhetoric of Dissent, supra note 48, at 174. 
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shared language with the public audiences to which it communicates.76 That is, 
the dissent must deploy terms of convergence to legitimize the critical perspec-
tive set forth in the dissent and also reorient the audience to the dissent’s de-
sired ends.77 
The challenge of providing vocabulary to a dissent’s audience is the simul-
taneity of that audience. That is, a dissent writer composes a dissent with an eye 
towards addressing a variety of internal and external audiences who have po-
tential influence over the mechanisms for forwarding a dissent’s goals.78 These 
audiences range from current and future judges, to lawyers working both within 
and outside of the case in which a dissent originates, to legislatures that can de-
velop laws, to administrative agencies that can issue regulations, relative to the 
issue generating dissent, and to citizens who have a vested or potential interest 
in the issue at hand.79 Dissent writers signal to all of these audiences simultane-
ously, working to cultivate them to the writer’s proposition for the future by in-
viting them to overhear and bear witness to a disagreement.80 Ultimately, be-
cause of this simultaneity, dissents are best understood as genres of public 
rhetoric, documents written for change that require broad engagement from a 
range of legal and non-legal stakeholders.81 The holding space in which a dis-
sent operates creates a public82 forum for these stakeholders to unite, deliberate, 
and develop advocacy strategies for actualizing the dissent’s goals. 
C. The Opportunity for Dissent Pedagogy in Law 
Beyond Belleau and Johnson’s “Ten Theses on Dissent,”83 there is limited 
scholarship directly addressing the pedagogical promise of dissents. Much 
scholarship about legal pedagogy focuses on the use or usefulness of the So-
cratic method, or both.84 Yet, as has been noted repeatedly, the Socratic method 
 
76  For discussions of the importance of shared language development in professional con-
texts see Mark A. Hannah, Objects of O2: A Posthuman Analysis of Differentiated Language 
Use in a Cross-Disciplinary Research Partnership, in POSTHUMAN PRAXIS IN TECHNICAL 
COMMUNICATION 217 (Kristen R. Moore & Daniel P. Richards eds., 2018); Ariel D. Anbar et 
al., Bridge the Planetary Divide, 539 NATURE 25, 27 (2016); Mark A. Hannah & Christina 
Saidy, Locating the Terms of Engagement: Shared Language Development in Secondary to 
Postsecondary Writing Transitions, 66 C. COMPOSITION & COMM. 120, 122 (2014); Mark A. 
Hannah & Chris Lam, Patterns of Dissemination: Examining and Documenting Practitioner 
Knowledge Sharing Practices on Blogs, 63 TECH. COMM. 328, 329 (2016). 
77  Frost, Rhetoric of Dissent, supra note 48, at 173; Ivie, supra note 7, at 52. 
78  Bartanen, supra note 7, at 243; Brennan, Jr., supra note 49, at 432; Bryan & Ringsmuth, 
supra note 8, at 162. 
79  See Michael Warner, Publics and Counterpublics, 14 PUB. CULTURE 49, 49 (2002). 
80  Courtright, supra note 48, at 130. 
81  See Ellen Cushman, The Rhetorician as an Agent of Social Change, 47 C. COMPOSITION & 
COMM. 7, 7 (1996). 
82  Warner, supra note 79, at 50. 
83  Belleau & Johnson, supra note 6, at 156. 
84  Jamie R. Abrams, Reframing the Socratic Method, 64 J. LEGAL EDUC. 562, 562–63 
(2015); Christie A. Linskens Christie, What Critiques Have Been Made of the Socratic 
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often stifles dissent.85 As a result, students are left with little opportunity to im-
agine the role and purpose of dissent in the development of the law in general 
or, more importantly, its potential influence on the development of their reason-
ing and writing abilities. 
Ultimately, we argue that dissents are superior tools for providing law stu-
dents with a vocabulary for seeing and understanding rhetoric and its complexi-
ty more broadly. While existing scholarship is useful for its description of dis-
sents’ characteristics—in particular in its attention to foundational rhetorical 
concepts such as purpose, voice, and audience—the scholarship lacks a critical 
vocabulary for assessing the rhetorical nature of dissents more broadly.86 In the 
next Part of this Article, we demonstrate how dissents offer legal educators 
unique opportunities to introduce across the law school curriculum more com-
plex rhetorical concepts that can heighten law students’ nascent understandings 
of law’s close relationship with rhetoric. 
II. RHETORIC AND ITS COMPLEXITY 
To help students think beyond the genre of dissent and build a critical vo-
cabulary for assessing rhetoric more broadly and accounting for its complexity, 
we discuss in this Part unique pedagogical opportunities that dissents offer for 
heightening law students’ understanding of the close connection between law 
and rhetoric. In particular, we note how dissents make visible and advance 
more complex understandings of four foundational rhetorical concepts: (1) the 
rhetorical situation, (2) rhetorical circulation, (3) intertextuality, and (4) kairos. 
Through focusing on these concepts, law students will develop an appreciation 
for the essence of law’s relationality and the effect of contingency on legal 
practice. That is, through studying dissents and these concepts more intention-
ally, law students will bear witness to how law is most properly captured in its 
relations and uncertainties rather than its outputs and representations of black 
letter law.87 
 
Method in Legal Education: The Socratic Method in Legal Education: Uses, Abuses and Be-
yond, 12 EUR. J.L. REFORM 340, 340 (2010); Jeffrey D. Jackson, Socrates and Langdell in 
Legal Writing: Is the Socratic Method a Proper Tool for Legal Writing Courses?, 43 CAL. 
W. L. REV. 267, 267–68 (2007); Orin S. Kerr, The Decline of the Socratic Method at Har-
vard, 78 NEB. L. REV. 113, 115 (1999); Anthony Kronman, The Socratic Method and the 
Development of the Moral Imagination, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 647, 647 (2000). 
85  Christie, supra note 84, at 348; Jackson, supra note 84, at 302; Kerr, supra note 84, at 
118; Kronman, supra note 84, at 649. 
86  See Christie, supra note 84, at 345. 
87  Belleau & Johnson, supra note 6, at 172. Here, we draw from Belleau and Johnson’s 
recognition of dissents as useful tools for emphasizing law’s processes over its outputs. For a 
useful discussion about contingency in rhetoric and “the social contingency of meaning[,]” 
see Paul M. Dombrowski, Challenger and the Social Contingency of Meaning: Two Lessons 
for the Technical Communication Classroom, 1 TECH. COMM. Q. 73, 73 (1992). 
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A. Rhetorical Situation 
The concept of rhetorical situation was introduced by Lloyd Bitzer in 1968 
to answer his question regarding the nature of the contexts in which speakers or 
writers create rhetorical discourse.88 In response, Bitzer defined a rhetorical sit-
uation “as a complex of persons, events, objects, and relations presenting an 
actual or potential exigence[,] which can be completely or partially removed if 
discourse, introduced into the situation, can so constrain human decision or ac-
tion as to bring about the significant modification of the exigence.”89 Through 
this definitional work, Bitzer casts rhetorical situations as bounded units or con-
texts that exist out there in the world waiting to be perceived by rhetors and ad-
dressed through their discourse.90 
Bitzer’s work is foundational for its attempt to locate how discourse arises 
to address perceived imperfections in the world,91 yet not long after its publica-
tion, Bitzer’s bounded conception was challenged for being too limited and 
constraining. For example, Richard Vatz argued that rhetorical situations do not 
simply exist out there waiting to be perceived but instead are created by rhetors 
through the choices they make when articulating a context of events.92 Vatz’s 
argument shifted agency over to the rhetor, endowing that person with a capaci-
ty to create conditions for discourse through creating rhetorical situations and 
therefore freeing the rhetor from the constraints of a pre-determined, bounded 
situation. 
Though important for its recognition of a rhetor’s agency, Vatz’s work es-
tablished a dissatisfying binary for evaluating rhetorical situations—an already-
formed situation versus a to-be-determined situation—that rhetorical scholars 
have been working earnestly to think beyond for nearly half a century. Exam-
ples of this critical work include calls to find a middle ground in the binary and 
see rhetoric as an art;93 to emphasize multiplicity or the reality of multiple au-
diences, exigences, and constraints that influence rhetorical situations;94 to 
challenge the presumptions that audiences are fully formed and unified and that 
rhetorical situations are identity producing events;95 to recognize that rhetorical 
situations are not a collection of single situations but instead are part of an eco-
 
88  Lloyd F. Bitzer, The Rhetorical Situation, 1 PHIL. & RHETORIC 1, 1 (1968). 
89  Id. at 6. 
90  Id. at 5, 9. 
91  In rhetoric and communication scholarship, Bitzer’s rhetorical situation analysis is gener-
ally the standard citation for defining this concept and is the foundation upon which subse-
quent theorizing builds. See infra notes 94–99 for some examples of subsequent theorization. 
92  Richard E. Vatz, The Myth of the Rhetorical Situation, 6 PHIL. & RHETORIC 154, 154, 156 
(1973). There is some precedent in legal scholarship for acknowledging the capacity of exp 
ert writers to construct rhetorical situations. See Berger, Studying, supra note 7, at 61–62. 
93  Scott Consigny, Rhetoric and Its Situations, 7 PHIL. & RHETORIC 175, 185 (1974). 
94  Craig R. Smith & Scott Lybarger, Bitzer’s Model Reconstructed, 44 COMM. Q. 197, 197 
(1996). 
95  Barbara A. Biesecker, Rethinking the Rhetorical Situation from Within the Thematic of 
Différance, 22 PHIL. & RHETORIC 110, 110 (1989). 
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logical network of exchanges and communications that bleed between and in-
form each other;96 and finally to acknowledge that discourse circulates through 
our everyday activities and thus does not exist in one place but instead exists as 
passing through and thus never located.97 Across each of these extended retheo-
rizations of the rhetorical situation, we see increasing appreciation for the com-
plexity and fluidity of conditions that give rise to discourse, conditions that are 
potentially both constraining and generative and work across time and space 
rather than bound up in a location. 
With this background in mind, we are led to ask how rhetorical situations 
are presented in the law school classroom via the case method. In that method, 
rhetorical situations are the selected cases that arrive for students predeter-
mined—prepackaged if you will—in a textbook. Those cases are constrained to 
a particular fact pattern and application of law that led to a specific legal out-
come, which the students try to discern through principles of legal reasoning. In 
this scenario, students are directed to look at the case in a Bitzerian fashion, as 
found.98 They are invited to think through how the exigence, the audience, and 
the constraints within the case work together and lead to the eventual holding. 
Admittedly, there is some connection to other rhetorical situations or cases 
through discussions and acknowledgements of precedent or other historical 
cases that influence the holding in a case. However, the acknowledgement of a 
rhetorical situation’s complexity is tacit. Students generally work through case 
history, or rhetorical situation history, and are often not prompted to consider 
the range of other factors—political, social, economic, interpersonal, etc.—that 
influenced the production of discourse in the case initially selected for review. 
Rather, usually they are asked to distinguish cases on fine, nuanced grounds, 
thus reifying the isolated conception of the Bitzerian rhetorical situation. 
Dissents help law students think beyond the limits of the Bitzerian rhetori-
cal situation before them, the case in which they are working and developing 
legal discourse on behalf of a hypothetical client. Specifically, as change 
agents, dissents naturally and intentionally look beyond the rhetorical situation 
in which their authors’ positions have lost and seek, through discourse, to cre-
ate a new rhetorical situation for their ideas to operate and thrive.99 Of note in 
 
96  Jenny Edbauer, Unframing Models of Public Distribution: From Rhetorical Situation to 
Rhetorical Ecologies, 35 RHETORIC SOC’Y Q. 5, 19 (2005). 
97  Catherine Chaput, Rhetorical Circulation in Late Capitalism: Neoliberalism and the 
Overdetermination of Affective Energy, 43 PHIL. & RHETORIC 1, 20 (2010). 
98  As an example, in her discussion of the schism between doctrinal and skills courses, Kris-
ten Konrad Robbins-Tiscione cites Bitzer as her initial scholarly source for rhetorical situa-
tion awareness. ROBBINS-TISCIONE, supra note 43, at 83. 
99  We acknowledge here that the Vatzian conception of creating rhetorical situations that we 
are positing for dissent writing is not without its limits. That is, dissent authors are not entire-
ly free to create a rhetorical situation in any way they see fit, or as Clarke Rountree described 
in his keynote address at the Classical Rhetoric and Contemporary Law Symposium, you just 
can’t “Vatz your way out of a situation.” See Clarke Rountree, Address at the University of 
Nevada, Las Vegas, William S. Boyd School of Law Symposium: Classical Rhetoric as a 
Lens for Contemporary Legal Praxis (Sept. 27, 2019) (on file with author). However, we are 
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the move to look beyond is how dissents restore law students’ connections with 
the law’s relationality, which is severed by the Bitzerian impulse to look only 
to address the motivating exigence of the pre-existing rhetorical situation. More 
specifically, when thinking through the law’s relationality, students are com-
pelled to look beyond the defined rhetorical situation at hand and assess the po-
tential influence of other nonlegal factors, circumstances, exigences, and actors 
circulating beyond it. Ultimately, in looking beyond the isolated rhetorical situ-
ation, a dissent creates the necessary discursive holding space for the dissent 
and its attendant ideas to interact and grow and create the kinds of conditions 
that are necessary for the corrective action called forth in the dissent to occur. 
For such change to happen though, lawyers must also look beyond a newly cre-
ated rhetorical situation and assess how it can work in tandem with discourse 
from other situations and contexts to affect a change in the law. Such a collabo-
rative perspective on rhetorical situations requires an ecological perspective 
and a shift in many students’ rhetorical imaginations towards the movements of 
rhetorical circulation. 
B. Rhetorical Circulation 
Generally speaking, rhetorical circulation is understood as the ways in 
which texts and discourse move through time and space. More specifically, rhe-
torical circulation attends to the ways rhetoric moves, unanchored, through our 
everyday, situated lives.100 An emphasis on movement within rhetorical circu-
lation draws attention to the constitutive nature of rhetoric, as rhetoric being a 
living environment101 in which various rhetorical situations come together and 
collaborate to produce some kind of change through discourse.102 An outcome 
of the continuous change spurred by rhetorical circulation is that dialogue re-
mains open and resists closure through new articulations that are created in 
communicative exchanges.103 Of note in these exchanges is that old articula-
tions do not die off and disappear. Rather, they retain some form of discursive 
energy and remain available to be drawn into future circulation and participate 
 
drawn to Vatz’s recognition of a rhetor’s agency in creating rhetorical situations and hope 
through our proposed dissent pedagogy to cultivate in students an awareness of the different 
authoring roles potentially available to them as practitioners. 
100  Chaput, supra note 97, at 20. Chaput also notes that circulation asks rhetors to think of 
rhetoric as continuously moving through and connecting different instantiations within a 
complex world. Id. at 6; see also Jason Edward Black, Native Authenticity, Rhetorical Circu-
lation, and Neocolonial Decay: The Case of Chief Seattle’s Controversial Speech, 15 
RHETORIC & PUB. AFF. 635, 636 (2012). Black also notes how “fragmented discourse circu-
lates says much about a public that interprets it and the ideologies that underscore that par-
ticular public’s civic imaginary.” Id. Black’s argument here has significant implications for 
how dissents reintroduce politics into legal discourse that the legal system sought to exclude. 
101  Black, supra note 100, at 636; Edbauer, supra note 96, at 13. 
102  See Black, supra note 100, at 640; Chaput, supra note 97, at 6–7 (discussing Louis Al-
thusser’s articulation of rhetoric as an overdetermined practice). 
103  See Black, supra note 100, at 637. 
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in the accrual and evolution of meaning over time.104 A distinctive feature of 
rhetorical circulation and its influence on meaning making and knowledge pro-
duction is that it operates independent of formal reasoning processes and re-
quires no structural framework or planning for its effects to take shape.105 That 
is, rhetorical circulation is an always- and already-emergent phenomenon, and 
through understanding such structureless emergence, rhetors begin to appreci-
ate that discourse cannot be bound by situations.106 By extension, rhetors also 
then realize that they are not bound by situations. They realize they “are never 
outside the network[] . . . of forces”107 and will therefore create the kinds of 
rhetorical energy that drives rhetorical circulation through their decision-
making. 
Dissents operate on a logic of rhetorical circulation. As forward-looking, 
deliberative compositions, they depend on the accrual of energy and evolution 
of meaning over time to achieve the desired changes in law that they offer as 
propositions for readers to consider.108 Specifically, as change agents, dissents 
are connective events that work to draw in traces of legal and nonlegal texts 
and discourses to create new articulations in light of their expressed proposi-
tion, the primary aim of which is to increase communicative exchanges and the 
dissemination of positive affective discursive energy109 through the discursive 
holding space they create. Of note for their desires to keep dialogue open via 
new articulations, dissents work against the grain of law’s closed discourse sys-
tem.110 That is, they draw on the structureless nature of circulation to combat 
the organizing force of law, which is governed by logical ordering schema and 
the principles of legal reasoning—rationality, objectivity, hierarchy, precedent, 
etc.111 
By developing an awareness of the opportunity for and power of working 
against the grain of law’s organizing schema, law students are better able to see 
that law does not exist in a location, in a box of black-letter law. Rather, the 
law exists in its relations that manifest through students’ own decision-making 
processes when developing and communicating a legal argument for a dissent 
 
104  Id. 
105  Chaput, supra note 97, at 11. 
106  Id. at 8. 
107  Id. at 12. 
108  Campbell, III, supra note 9, at 307. Campbell acknowledges law’s transcendence, specif-
ically, that law encompasses more than the present in its spread. Id. Put simply, law creates 
surpluses that carry forward and shape future legal decision-making processes. It is this sur-
plus from which rhetorical circulation draws its force and energy from for shaping the pro-
duction of discourse across time and space. For a useful discussion of surplus, see generally 
EUGENE GARVER, FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT: PRACTICAL REASONING, CHARACTER, AND 
THE ETHICS OF BELIEF (2004); see also Francis J. Mootz, III & Leticia M. Saucedo, The 
“Ethical” Surplus of the War on Illegal Immigration, 15 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 257, 257–
58, 262 (2012). 
109  Chaput, supra note 97, at 8. 
110  Gibson, supra note 63, at 125. 
111  See CARTER & BURKE, supra note 6, at xiv. 
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or any other legal context. Rhetorical circulation invites students to witness this 
existence. An extension of the heightened awareness of law’s relationality that 
develops through examining rhetorical circulation in the context of dissents is 
that students are encouraged to see that meaning is not tied to situations or loca-
tions but instead will develop through accrual and collaboration between situa-
tions and locations over time.112 A reversal of a majority decision, which is the 
ultimate aim of the written dissent, requires a passing of time and attendant ac-
crual. The reversal will not just appear out of nowhere. Instead it will emerge 
and pop up from some nexus of circulating factors and be flavored historically 
by the predominant events, ideologies, and attitudes that shaped public percep-
tions of the issue at hand. As such, rhetorical circulation makes clear dissents’ 
important roles as genres of public rhetoric that activate the kinds of change 
that are necessary to realign the democratic ideals of law with present day facts 
and circumstances. 
C. Intertextuality 
Intertextuality is a concept that describes the relationships that exist be-
tween and among texts, examples of which include connections established by 
“citations, quotations, allusions, borrowings, adaptations, appropriations, paro-
dy, pastiche, imitation, and the like.”113 In this definition, it is easy to recognize 
the close relationship between rhetorical circulation and intertextuality and the 
overlap in the kinds of work they do. Foremost among their similarities are 
their both being constitutive, relational concepts114 that establish new articula-
tions that create changes and reshape communities.115 Intertextuality, in par-
ticular, is constitutive for the ways it reactivates a text and gives it new discur-
sive life by connecting it to another text and drawing off or borrowing from its 
ideas.116 Furthermore, intertextuality has a Vatzian quality in that it can create 
its own contexts or rhetorical situations that invite readers to consider a new 
perspective.117 
 
112  See Kristen K. Robbins, Paradigm Lost: Recapturing Classical Rhetoric to Validate Le-
gal Reasoning, 27 VT. L. REV. 483, 488 (2003) [hereinafter Robbins, Paradigm Lost]. 
113  Frank J. D’Angelo, The Rhetoric of Intertextuality, 29 RHETORIC REV. 31, 33 (2010). 
D’Angelo discusses Julia Kristeva’s development of intertextuality as a concept in her Revo-
lution in Poetic Language. Id. 
114  See Belleau & Johnson, supra note 6, at 156; James E. Porter, Intertextuality and the 
Discourse Community, 5 RHETORIC REV. 34, 40 (1986). 
115  Porter, supra note 114, at 41; see also Heinrich F. Plett, Rhetoric and Intertextuality, 17 
RHETORICA 313, 325 (1999) (discussing how intertextuality alters community commonplaces 
that have lost decorum or are no longer in accordance with generally acknowledged social 
norms). 
116  Plett, supra note 115, at 317. For a useful discussion about how law is activated via con-
nections in the French legal system, see Mark A. Hannah, Flexible Assembly: Latour, Law, 
and the Linking(s) of Composition, in THINKING WITH BRUNO LATOUR IN RHETORIC AND 
COMPOSITION 219, 224–25 (Paul Lynch & Nathaniel Rivers eds., 2015). 
117  D’Angelo, supra note 115, at 33. 
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Despite these similarities, intertextuality is distinguishable from rhetorical 
circulation in one small, but significant way: they differ in terms of the level at 
which they operate. Rhetorical circulation is a macro concept attuned to dis-
courses, texts, events, actors, ideologies, and so forth that operate outside the 
scope of the immediate case at hand, whereas intertextuality is a micro concept 
that explicitly functions at the local level in a specific case. More specifically, 
as a micro concept, intertextuality recognizes that circulation is mediated by 
localized community, disciplinary factors, or both. In law, examples of mediat-
ing factors include legal reasoning principles, precedent, court types, hierarchy, 
and objectivity, to name a few. 
The significance of this distinction may seem small; however, there is 
something fundamental regarding the scale at which the two concepts operate. 
Specifically, it is the way in which constraints function. As noted previously in 
this Article, rhetorical circulation operates independent of formal reasoning 
processes and requires no structural framework or planning for its effects to 
take shape.118 Intertextuality, on the other hand, is highly constrained, struc-
tured work. Intertextual success is defined as having the ability to know what 
can be presupposed in discourse and knowing how to borrow and link items ef-
fectively.119 Viewing success in this way casts authors as assemblers, as rhetors 
who must extend their analyses of audience beyond human agents and their at-
titudes, ideologies, dispositions, and the like, to the community expectations 
and standards that condition and predispose those agents’ day-to-day actions.120 
Shifting our look to dissents with this background about intertextuality in 
mind, it is clear that dissents are intentionally intertextual. They participate as a 
genre of revitalization in the larger legal discourse community that is interested 
in pursuing truth and meaning about a particular legal issue whose value is be-
ing questioned.121 
Certain members of the legal community are searching for potential ways 
to innovate the law and forward a new articulation about the topic in ques-
tion.122 When composing, dissent authors assemble a range of legal and nonle-
gal texts and draw connections between them to shift the public imagination 
regarding a new proposition for forwarding law and justice.123 The aspiration of 
the dissent is to alter or change the constitution of the legal community through 
intentional acts of questioning and doubting, while simultaneously affirming 
the values of the rule of law.124 The desired change likely will not materialize 
quickly. But the on-the-ground conditions have been modified by the dissent, 
 
118  Chaput, supra note 97, at 6. 
119  See Porter, supra note 114, at 34. 
120  Id. at 40. 
121  See sources cited supra notes 61–63. 
122  Porter, supra note 114, at 38. 
123  Id. at 34. 
124  Belleau & Johnson, supra note 6, at 160; Courtright, supra note 48, at 141; Frost, Rheto-
ric of Dissent, supra note 48, at 173. 
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and though the initial change may be small and perhaps even indiscernible, 
those newly emergent, on-the-ground conditions will serve as incipient infra-
structure upon which activated legal and nonlegal discursive resources can be 
combined to build new articulations. 
As part of their intertextual character, dissents also provide useful opportu-
nities for law students to consider the role of constraints in their writing and 
reasoning processes. Constraint is arguably the key defining feature of the prac-
tice of law or what it means to think and communicate like a lawyer.125 Being 
intentional about directing more attention to dissents and their intertextual na-
ture brings the issue of constraint to the fore in a new way: not simply in terms 
of the constrains inherent in the practice of law, but also in regard to the con-
straints of a community, its assumptions and presumptions that will determine 
the success of an intertextual articulation.126 Thinking through intertextuality in 
the context of dissents prompts law students to consider legal constraint and 
community or social constraint as hand-in-hand or simultaneous features of ar-
gumentation. Learning how to operate freely and have some authorial control 
over what discursive artifacts and traces are assembled between these different 
types of constraints can be challenging for law students, and engaging dissents 
can be a useful way for them to practice how to exercise such authorial control 
and account for both law and societal or community norms. Put differently, dis-
sents provide law students with opportunities to learn how to leverage intertex-
tuality and create conditions for change by authoring both in and outside of the 
law. 
D. Kairos 
Generally understood as the opportune moment for action, kairos is a wide-
ly discussed and foundational component of rhetorical theory.127 In fact, some 
rhetorical scholars have cast kairos as rhetoric’s linchpin (i.e., “[r]hetoric is the 
art which seeks to capture in opportune moments that which is appropriate and 
attempts to suggest that which is possible.”)128 The duality that operates in 
kairos—identifying not only the opportune moment but also that which is pos-
sible in that moment—requires rhetors to engage in a nuanced balancing act. 
They must have a capacity to discern and evaluate rhetorical factors such as 
 
125  CARTER & BURKE, supra note 6, at 86–87; WHITE, supra note 6, at 237; Belleau & John-
son, supra note 6, at 174. 
126  Porter, supra note 114, at 43. 
127  See generally RHETORIC AND KAIROS: ESSAYS IN HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRAXIS (Phillip 
Sipiora & James S. Baumlin eds., 2002); Michael Carter, Stasis and Kairos: Principles of 
Social Construction in Classical Rhetoric, 7 RHETORIC REV. 97 (1988); James L. Kinneavy 
& Catherine R. Eskin, Kairos in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, 17 WRITTEN COMM. 432 (2000); Car-
olyn R. Miller, Kairos in the Rhetoric of Science, in A RHETORIC OF DOING: ESSAYS ON 
WRITTEN DISCOURSE IN HONOR OF JAMES L. KINNEAVY 310 (Stephen P. Witte et al. eds., 
1992). 
128  John Poulakos, Toward a Sophistic Definition of Rhetoric, 16 PHIL. & RHETORIC 35, 36 
(1983). 
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audience, context, and purpose as well as more expansive influences such as 
effects spread by rhetorical circulation and intertextuality. If successful in their 
balancing work, rhetors will perceive an opening for action, an opening that 
calls forth discourse to address a perceived imperfection in the world. 
In law, perception of the opportune moment is complicated by additional 
constraints operating within the legal system, ranging from legal reasoning 
principles and their thrust of rationality and objectivity, to the ways that legal 
roles (e.g., prosecutor vs. defense attorney), shape and precondition legal deci-
sion-making, to jurisprudential ideology (e.g., originalism and legal realism), to 
who is sitting on a multi-member court that will evaluate a dissent and deter-
mine whether the time is right for a change in the law to occur.129 Balancing 
these legal constraints along with the previously mentioned rhetorical and so-
cial constraints poses unique rhetorical challenges for law students in the pro-
cesses of learning to think like a lawyer. Unfortunately, while in this process, 
law students do not have many opportunities to practice this balancing act. 
Specifically, law students are given cases to study and fact patterns to respond 
to. The opportunity to determine when is an appropriate time to respond is sel-
dom, if ever, at issue for law students. They simply respond when called upon. 
Admittedly, this is a bit of an oversimplification, but in general, identifying the 
opportune time or opening to respond within is not a part of the decision-
making apparatus for law students. As such, the “when” of kairos is not obvi-
ous in legal education. 
Dissents directly ask law students to respond to the question of “when” in 
legal contexts, as they are created in a perceived opening created by an adverse 
judgment. To act in this kairotic opening, dissent authors write to create the 
discursive holding space for rhetorical circulation and intertextuality to set in. 
Within this holding space, new articulations and textual relations are activated 
and reactivated to generate the necessary discursive energy for circulating the 
dissent conversation that has as its express aim the altering of the community 
whose acceptance is necessary for realizing the proposed change in law. 
Beyond asking students to respond to the general question of “when,” dis-
sents also are useful for expanding law students’ understandings of the poten-
tial influence of kairos in legal communication. Simply put, because dissents 
require time to take effect, they add a quantitative or chronos aspect of time to 
kairos.130 As such, identifying the opportune moment for composing a dissent 
requires a shift away from a moment to an ecological, collaborative view of 
 
129  Berzon, supra note 61, at 1485–87; Kirby, supra note 62, at 7–8; Mijatov, supra note 63, 
at 80. 
130  See James S. Baumlin & Tita French Baumlin, Chronos, Kairos, Aion: Failures of Deco-
rum, Right-Timing, and Revenge in Shakespeare’s Hamlet, in RHETORIC AND KAIROS: 
ESSAYS IN HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRAXIS 165–66, 175, 179 (2002); Ashley Rose Kelly et 
al., Considering Chronos and Kairos in Digital Media Rhetorics, in DIGITAL RHETORIC AND 
GLOBAL LITERACIES: COMMUNICATION MODES AND DIGITAL PRACTICES IN THE NETWORKED 
WORLD 229–31 (2014). 
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multiple kairotic moments as accumulating and accruing through time. In this 
ecology, such moments circulate and work together to create the kairotic open-
ing for the dissent’s ultimate success in achieving the change in the law the dis-
sent initially set forth propositionally. 
Deciphering what has made this opening the opportune and appropriate 
moment requires judgment informed by notions of rhetorical circulation and 
intertextuality. Such judgment sifts and sorts through history, events, ideolo-
gies, attitudes, and the like that circulate in the macro context of the dissent is-
sue. Furthermore, such judgment evaluates the competing yet mutually inform-
ing dimensions of the issue, e.g. the political, social, economic, institutional, 
religious, that create multiple discursive traces that animate discourse about the 
issue in question. Such judgment requires patience and flexibility to identify 
and assess a range of circulating factors that inform on the decision to write or 
not to write.131 
Ultimately, studying dissents leads us to ask: When is the right time to dis-
sent? What is the appropriate opening for dissent? What is possible to achieve 
with the dissent? Or, asked together, is now a time in which there is a favora-
ble, wider context for accepting the dissenting argument? Encouraging students 
to think critically about these questions and seek answers in a collaborative 
fashion with the professor will help students develop the kind of kairotic judg-
ment that is essential to the contemporary practice of law. 
III. IMPLEMENTATION IN THE DOCTRINAL CLASSROOM 
Most doctrinal professors already have students read and discuss dissents, 
particularly those dissents that advance arguments or theories that ultimately 
became law.132 Seldom, if ever, however, do professors in doctrinal classrooms 
explicitly discuss the dissents in terms of the rhetorical principles they might 
employ or illustrate. Although creative professors could devise various imagi-
native approaches to introducing advanced rhetorical concepts by using dis-
sents in the doctrinal classroom, this paper offers two suggestions: having the 
students draft a dissent to one of the cases discussed in class or assigning sup-
plemental and nonlegal readings along with a dissent to support an in-class dis-
cussion of the relevant rhetorical concepts. And, although professors could in-
troduce various different advanced rhetorical concepts using these approaches, 
this paper focuses on four: the rhetorical situation, rhetorical circulation, inter-
textuality, and kairos. Each approach involves three main steps: selecting the 
dissent, identifying content for pre-class preparation, and designing an in-class 
activity or out-of-class assignment (or both). 
 
131  The implementation sections of this article offer examples of cases like Delling v. Idaho 
to illustrate the challenge of balancing considerations of kairos and chronos when working to 
identify the opportune moment for writing a dissent. 
132  Greenhaw, supra note 10, at 893–94; see also Levine & Saunders, supra note 1, at 108. 
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Assigning students to write a short dissent to one of the cases discussed in 
class may be attractive for a few reasons. First, it advances the goal of incorpo-
rating writing across the law school curriculum133 without requiring the profes-
sor to devise a complicated hypothetical or simulate real-life law practice and 
without requiring the students to conduct outside research. If the professor im-
poses a short enough word count, reading and providing brief feedback on the 
assignments should not pose a significant burden, and the professor could even 
delegate that effort to teaching assistants or fellows. Second, it requires stu-
dents to engage with the cases and legal concepts in a way that encourages 
them to identify and question potentially faulty assumptions on which a line of 
legal reasoning is based. Third, and perhaps most importantly, it allows many 
students to reclaim the knowledge, experiences, and values they brought with 
them to law school, which law school often encourages students to stifle in or-
der to better exercise the dispassionate reasoning “required” to “think like a 
lawyer” and “discover” the “true law.”134 
Selecting the case probably presents the greatest challenge. The ideal case 
or cases would present opportunities for the students to consider other texts that 
might inform or influence the decision and the cultural, political, and jurispru-
dential climate in which the decision was written or in which the central legal 
dispute arose. The optimal case would also enable students to trace thoughts 
and ideas through various texts, including briefs from the parties or amici, 
through to the dissent. In selecting the case, the professor has three primary op-
tions: to assign all students the same case, to assign individual students differ-
ent cases, or to allow the students to select a case from among the ones covered 
in course readings and class discussion. Assigning all the students the same 
case has some advantages. The professor can better compare student papers to 
one another. The professor can focus in-class discussion around the single case. 
The professor has richer options in identifying content for pre-class preparation 
and can require students to read or view some of the materials that could inform 
student understanding of how the advanced rhetorical concepts come into play. 
Perhaps most significantly, selecting a single case makes it easier for the pro-
fessor to ensure that the case presents ample opportunities to explore the key 
rhetorical concepts the professor wishes to cover. On the other hand, assigning 
individual students different cases relieves some of the monotony of reading 
papers on the same topic. Although allowing students to choose their own cases 
makes it significantly more difficult to ensure that the cases facilitate the objec-
tives of the exercise, it has the advantage of enabling students to respond to a 
case or issue that provokes strong feelings or opinions in them. 
 
133  See Pamela Lysaght & Cristina D. Lockwood, Writing-Across-the-Law-School Curricu-
lum: Theoretical Justifications, Curricular Implications, 2 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING 
DIRECTORS 73, 99 (2004) (proposing that a “comprehensive writing-across-the-curriculum 
program in the law school context . . . offers a solution[]” to improving student writing and 
educating competent new lawyers). 
134  See Berger, Studying, supra note 7, at 63–64 (emphasis added). 
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Content for pre-class preparation could include something as simple as 
having the students read short descriptions of the rhetorical situation, circula-
tion, intertextuality, and kairos from texts on rhetoric or even from web sources 
like Wikipedia.135 If the professor assigns a single case or a limited selection of 
cases, the professor should also assign texts that help to put that case or those 
cases in a cultural, political, social, and jurisprudential context. Texts could in-
clude news articles or opinion pieces, artistic pieces like short stories, film 
clips, or selections from novels, or even print or television advertisements or 
public-service announcements, along with excerpts from the parties’ briefs and 
any influential amicus briefs. 
The in-class activity could begin with a brief discussion of the rhetorical 
concepts at issue and how they might affect a dissent. The professor could use 
the key case to guide students through identifying the exigence, the audience, 
and the constraints. The professor could then invite students to talk about the 
ideas, texts, and arguments covered in the assigned reading that might cause an 
author to frame the legal analysis differently and support or justify a different 
outcome. Then, after and informed by this class discussion, the students would 
write a short dissent outside of class, focusing less on case law and more on 
challenging the majority opinion through arguments shaped and informed by 
the rhetorical concepts at play. 
Alternatively, a professor might teach these advanced rhetorical concepts 
by assigning supplemental and nonlegal readings along with a dissent to sup-
port an in-class discussion of those concepts. Along with the dissent, the pro-
fessor could assign newspaper articles or opinion pieces that shed light on the 
social, political, and cultural environment in which the case was decided or in 
which the law being challenged arose, or texts that otherwise inform the dissent 
or a reader’s understanding of the dissent. The professor could also assign ex-
cerpts from relevant briefings in the case, including any influential amicus 
briefs. 
For example, Justice Harlan’s dissent in Miranda v. Arizona136 asserts con-
cerns about increased crime, criminals escaping justice, and depriving law en-
forcement of essential tools—all themes prevalent in popular culture and media 
in the ensuing years.137 A professor having students read the majority opinion 
and dissent in Miranda v. Arizona might also have students watch portions of 
the movie Dirty Harry or urban dystopian melodramas like 1972’s original 
 
135  See, e.g., Intertextuality, WIKIPEDIA.COM, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intertextuality [ht 
tps://perma.cc/ACV3-WA9D] (last visited Mar. 22, 2020); Kairos, WIKIPEDIA.COM, https 
://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kairos [https://perma.cc/XK3H-78FP] (last visited Mar. 22, 2020);  
Rhetorical Circulation, WIKIPEDIA.COM, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rhetorical_circulation 
[https://perma.cc/Z8WC-46SB] (last visited Mar. 22, 2020); Rhetorical Situation, WIKIPED 
IA.COM, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rhetorical_situation [https://perma.cc/9YKP-WK77]  
(last visited Mar. 22, 2020). 
136  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 504–24 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
137  Id. at 517, 524. 
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Death Wish.138 Students could also read news articles about the ballooning of 
the U.S. crime rate in the 1970s, about Richard Nixon’s “War on Crime” and 
how Nixon used fear of crime to his political advantage, and about local news’s 
overwhelming shift in focus from public-affairs journalism to sensationalist 
scene-of-the-crime “breaking news,” even after the crime rate began to fall in 
the 1990s.139 
Alternatively, a professor teaching antitrust law or sports law could have 
the students read Justice Marshall’s dissent in Flood v. Kuhn,140 the decision 
that upheld Major League Baseball’s antitrust exemption. In his dissent, Justice 
Marshall compared baseball’s reserve clause to involuntary servitude.141 Along 
with the dissent, the professor could assign selections from books and articles 
about the reserve-clause controversy or about racial issues in baseball and in 
sports in general in the middle of the twentieth century, or even poetic pieces 
waxing lyrical about America’s “national pastime” (as indeed Justice 
Blackmun waxed in his majority opinion).142 
 
138  I now realize that my law school “Film and the Law” class taught by the incomparable 
Professor Terry K. Diggs, was implicitly about rhetorical circulation, intertextuality, and 
kairos. 
139  See, e.g., Walker Newell, The Legacy of Nixon, Reagan, and Horton: How the Tough on 
Crime Movement Enabled a New Regime of Race-Influenced Employment Discrimination, 
15 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 3, 14–16 (2013) (discussing the rise of “tough on 
crime” politics in the late 1960s and 1970s); Law and Order (Politics), WIKIPEDIA.COM, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_and_order_(politics) [https://perma.cc/WT2Z-2XQZ] 
 (last visited Mar. 22, 2020) (discussing Richard Nixon’s “law and order” campaign in the 
1968 election); Jeremy Lipschultz, The Origins of Crime News on TV, OXFORD RES. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIMINOLOGY (Apr. 2017), https://oxfordre.com/criminology/view/10.109 
3/acrefore/9780190264079.001.0001/acrefore-9780190264079-e-57 [https://perma.cc/T3SR- 
XC9K] (“In the United States in the 1970s, local ‘action news’ formats, driven by live 
 broadcast technologies and consultant recommendations designed to improve ratings, 
changed the nature of television news. Specifically, industry watchers perceived a shift from 
public affairs journalism about politics, issues, and government toward an emphasis on prof-
itable live, breaking news from the scene of the crime.”); Yeoman Lowbrow, Alarmed and 
Dangerous: A Look at Crime in 1970s–80s America, FLASHBAK (Nov. 12, 2014), https://fla 
shbak.com/alarmed-and-dangerous-a-look-at-crime-in-1970s-80s-america-25282/ 
[https://perma.cc/74SJ-BKW3] (describing the perception of rampant crime in the 1970s and 
detailing some of the manifestations of that obsession in popular culture); Terence McArdle, 
The ‘Law and Order’ Campaign that Won Richard Nixon the White House 50 Years Ago, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2018/11/05/law-order-
campaign-that-won-richard-nixon-white-house-years-ago/ [https://perma.cc/M999-FMDE];  
Barbara Millhausen, 1968 Nixon Law and Order, YOUTUBE (Sep. 26, 2016), https://www. 
youtube.com/watch?v=cEdtwQ8OguY [https://perma.cc/K68P-6CJN] (video of television ad 
for Nixon in 1968 campaign); Richard Nixon Campaign ’68, APM REPORTS, https://feat 
ures.apmreports.org/arw/campaign68/b1.html [https://perma.cc/57V5-L337] (last visited  
Mar. 22, 2020). 
140  Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 288 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
141  Id. at 289. 
142  Id. at 264; see also BRAD SNYDER, A WELL-PAID SLAVE: CURT FLOOD’S FIGHT FOR FREE 
AGENCY IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 130–31 (2006); Mary Craig, Chained to the Game: Pro-
fessional Baseball and the Reserve Clause, Part Two, SBNATION (June 10, 2017, 1:00 PM), 
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Or a professor teaching the insanity defense in criminal law could have 
students read the dissent to the denial of certiorari in Delling v. Idaho,143 a case 
involving a state statute essentially abolishing the traditional insanity de-
fense.144 In the wake of the Hinckley verdict in 1982,145 a number of states en-
acted similar statutes narrowing the insanity defense, shifting the burden of 
proof, or abolishing the defense outright and instead requiring defendants to as-
sert that their mental illnesses deprived them of the requisite mens rea for the 
underlying offenses.146 In his dissent to the denial of certiorari in Delling, Jus-
tice Breyer makes a point about culpability through a hypothetical comparing a 
murder defendant who asserts that he is not responsible because he believed his 
human victim was a wolf, on the one hand, with a murder defendant who as-
serts that he is not responsible because he believed that a wolf ordered him to 
commit the crime, on the other.147 The Breyer dissent went on to be cited in the 
briefing and the Kansas Supreme Court’s opinion in another case, State v. 
Kahler,148 involving another state statute essentially abolishing the traditional 
insanity defense,149 and in the briefing when the Supreme Court of the United 
States granted certiorari in 2019.150 During the SCOTUS oral arguments, Jus-
 
https://www.beyondtheboxscore.com/2017/6/10/15766702/curt-flood-mlbpa-reserve-clause-
free-agency [https://perma.cc/8FZS-U4Y2]; Allen Pusey, June 19, 1972: Curt Flood Loses 
 ‘Reserve Clause’ Challenge, A.B.A. J. (June 1, 2018, 12:35 AM), http://www.abajourna 
l.com/magazine/article/curt_flood_loses_reserve_clause_challenge [https://perma.cc/UT59- 
KTM9] (recounting the background of the Flood case). 
143  Delling v. Idaho, 568 U.S. 1038, 1039 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
144  Id. 
145  In 1981, John W. Hinckley, Jr. attempted to assassinate Ronald Reagan, then the Presi-
dent of the United States. See United States v. Hinckley, 407 F. Supp. 2d 248, 251 (D.D.C. 
2005); United States v. Hinckley, 525 F. Supp. 1342, 1345 (D.D.C. 1981). At the resulting 
criminal trial, Hinckley was found not guilty by reason of insanity and confined to a psychi-
atric hospital instead of prison. Hinckley, 407 F. Supp. 2d at 252. 
146  Public outrage in the wake of the verdict led to calls to abolish the insanity defense alto-
gether. See Kimberly Collins et al., The John Hinckley Trial & Its Effect on the Insanity De-
fense, UMKC, http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/hinckley/hinckleyinsanity.htm  
[https://perma.cc/8WCC-DFQ4] (last visited Mar. 22, 2020); Judi Hasson, Hinckley Verdict 
Backlash Decried, UNITED PRESS INT’L (Oct. 27, 1982), https://www.upi.com/Archives 
/1982/10/27/Hinckley-verdict-backlash-decried/3724404539200/ [https://perma.cc/2ST4-PV 
2P]; Natalie Jacewicz, After Hinckley, States Tightened Use of the Insanity Plea, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO (July 28, 2016, 10:20 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/07/28/4 
86607183/after-hinckley-states-tightened-use-of-the-insanity-plea [https://perma.cc/24NH-3 
XP2]. 
147  Delling, 568 U.S. at 1040 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
148  State v. Kahler, 410 P.3d 105, 125 (Kan. 2018). 
149  Id. 
150  Brief for Petitioner at 41–42, Kahler v. Kansas, 139 S. Ct. 1318 (2019) (mem.) (No. 18-
6135). 
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tice Breyer even posed the same hypothetical to the attorney for the State of 
Kansas, changing the wolf in both parts of the hypothetical to a dog.151 
A professor using Delling would assign the usual background reading on 
the key rhetorical concepts, along with the Delling dissent, portions of the 
briefing in Kahler at the Kansas Supreme Court level, portions of the majority 
opinion from the Kansas Supreme Court in Kahler, portions of the briefing be-
fore SCOTUS in Kahler, and key portions of the SCOTUS oral argument tran-
script (notably the colloquy between Breyer and the attorney for the State of 
Kansas). Along with these legal readings, the professor could assign articles on 
the John Hinckley trial and the public reaction to the verdict as well as the leg-
islative response.152 Finally, in light of Breyer’s curious choice of hypothetical, 
and particularly the shift from wolf to dog between the written dissent and the 
oral-argument colloquy, a professor should strongly consider assigning read-
ings on the Son of Sam crimes, David Berkowitz’s initial assertion that a de-
mon—speaking through his neighbor Sam’s dog, “Harvey”—ordered him to 
commit those crimes, and Berkowitz’s subsequent recantation of that story.153 
In class, the professor could then lead a discussion—or moderate small-
group discussions—of how an understanding of the advanced rhetorical con-
cepts might deepen an understanding of the dissent itself and the area of law in 
general, and how rhetorical concepts explain why an argument that is the dis-
sent in one case may become the majority opinion in a later era. After the class 
discussion, the professor could then assign a short, low-stakes reaction paper 
encouraging the students to reflect on how these outside readings and explicit 
considerations of the rhetorical situation, rhetorical circulation, intertextuality, 
and kairos might deepen their understanding of the dissent and how they might 
apply these tools to their reading of other cases in the future. 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION IN THE LEGAL WRITING CLASSROOM 
In the first semester of a first-year legal writing, research, and analysis 
(LRA) course, most schools teach the building blocks of legal writing and 
 
151  Transcript of Oral argument at 38–40, Kahler v. Kansas, 139 S. Ct. 1318 (2019) (mem.) 
(No. 18-6135). Interestingly, the attorney for the State of Kansas did not seem to have a 
well-prepared response to the hypothetical. See id. at 40. 
152  See, e.g., Hasson, supra note 146; Jacewicz, supra note 146; Douglas O. Linder, John 
Hinckley, Jr. Trial (1982), FAMOUS TRIALS https://famous-trials.com/johnhinckley [htt 
ps://perma.cc/K2X3-YXKF] (last visited Mar. 22, 2020). 
153  See, e.g., David Abrahamson, Unmasking Ion of Sam’s’, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 1979),  
https://www.nytimes.com/1979/07/01/archives/unmasking-son-of-sams-demons.html [https 
://perma.cc/2DWJ-DLFX]; Eugene S. Robinson, Meet the Serial Killer Who Took His Or-
ders from a Demon Dog, OZY (May 15, 2018), https://www.ozy.com/flashback/meet-the-
serial-killer-who-took-his-orders-from-a-demon-dog/86398/ [https://perma.cc/P28L-HXQ8]; 
David Berkowitz, WIKIPEDIA.COM, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Berkowitz [https:// 
perma.cc/Z66C-GHHW] (last visited Mar. 22, 2020); The “Son of Sam” Trial: 1978,  
ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, https://www.encyclopedia.com/law/law-magazines/son-sam-trial-1978  
[https://perma.cc/32DU-3B7D] (last updated Feb. 8, 2020). 
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analysis—the organizational paradigm, synthesizing a rule from multiple 
sources, and using case illustrations to explain how a legal rule operates in 
practice—through some form of predictive legal writing.154 In teaching rule 
synthesis in that first semester, professors often struggle to get new law stu-
dents to move beyond simply quoting the rule a court states in deciding a case 
and read the case more closely and critically to identify the perhaps-more-
nuanced rule that courts are actually applying in a certain area of law.155 To do 
this, students must be able to identify the dispositive facts—the facts that a 
court relies on in reaching a particular resolution.156 
In the second semester, many if not most students have mastered reading 
cases to identify the key dispositive facts and analyzing how they affect the 
outcome and inform the overall legal rule.157 Students may still struggle, 
though, to identify opportunities for analogical argument when no cases seem 
to address their facts or situation squarely.158 And even students who show 
greater aptitude for making analogies do not always recognize larger patterns in 
case law or common assumptions or narratives that run through different areas 
of the law.159 The next step, then, is encouraging students to read cases at an 
even deeper level to identify the undercurrents and thematic threads that allow 
lawyers to make creative, persuasive, and even world-changing legal arguments 
that remain tied to precedent, even where precedent seemingly on point is miss-
ing, unhelpful, or adverse. Explicitly teaching this handful of advanced rhetori-
cal concepts in the legal writing classroom can arm students with the vocabu-
lary to see a case as more than a vessel for holding, facts, and reasoning and 
allow them to identify patterns, analogies, and strategies for making more so-
phisticated and compelling legal arguments. 
An LRA professor might use a dissent to introduce these advanced rhetori-
cal concepts by having the students read and analyze a short dissent and then 
engage in a class discussion regarding the rhetorical concepts and how they 
 
154  ASS’N OF LEGAL WRITING DIRS. & LEGAL WRITING INST., REPORT OF THE 2017–2018 
INSTITUTIONAL SURVEY 25 (2017–18). 
155  See Fajans & Falk, supra note 21, at 163–64 (students are “seduced by the text[,]” and 
“fail to see how another author ‘worked’ the text on them.”). 
156  Greenhaw, supra note 10, at 883 (“A . . . lawyer needs to be able to discern the facts . . . 
to which a legally authoritative writing responded. Only then can the lawyer critically evalu-
ate it as a resource in the situation presented for analysis and give it the weight it deserves in 
his or her composition.”). 
157  See Stephanie Roberts Hartung & Shailini Jandial George, Promoting In-Depth Analysis: 
A Three-Part Approach to Teaching Analogical Reasoning to Novice Legal Writers, 39 
CUMB. L. REV. 685, 686 n.7 (2009). 
158  See id. at 686 (“While students are generally able to compare facts from precedent cases 
to their own set of facts, using these comparisons to effectively support a legal argument is a 
far more elusive skill.”); Robbins, Paradigm Lost, supra note 112, at 535 (“Weak and/or in-
complete analogies are most common among novice legal writers who struggle, without ad-
equate foundation, to mimic analogy within deduction.”). 
159  See Fajans and Falk, supra note 21, at 163 (“Even the best and brightest students too of-
ten scan judicial opinions for issue, holding, and reasoning and call that ‘reading.’ ”). 
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manifest in that dissent. Outside of class, the students could then apply this 
analysis to one of their major writing assignments and write a short, low-stakes 
paper analyzing those concepts in the context of that assignment and reflecting 
on how those concepts might influence how they approach the assignment. The 
ideal time to conduct this exercise would be after the students have become fa-
miliar with the facts and law at issue in the major writing assignment so that 
they can more readily see how the rhetorical concepts that manifest in the dis-
sent might also manifest in their major writing assignments. 
In selecting the dissent, like the professor in the doctrinal classroom, the 
LRA professor should select one that presents opportunities to talk about rhe-
torical circulation, intertextuality, and kairos.160 Short dissents are ideal because 
they allow the professor the time in class to walk the students through a close, 
critical reading of the dissent with the rhetorical concepts in mind. The profes-
sor should also give some thought to how the concepts might come into play in 
the major writing assignment, or even design the major writing assignment 
around opportunities to discuss those concepts. 
To prepare for class, students should read short selections describing the 
four advanced rhetorical concepts.161 In addition, just as in the doctrinal class-
room, the professor would also assign some legal—or more likely nonlegal—
texts that arm the students to recognize the arguments, assumptions, and ideas 
circulating in the culture at the time of the opinion that also pop up in the dis-
sent. 
In class, then, the LRA professor can either lead the entire class through a 
critical reading of the dissent to identify the rhetorical concepts at play and the 
texts or ideas that pop up, or she can moderate smaller-group discussions. The 
professor might even assign the groups to jointly draft a short rhetorical analy-
sis of the dissent in class. 
After discussing the concepts in class and exploring them through a close 
reading of the dissent, outside of class, the students would then turn to explor-
ing those concepts in the context of one of their major legal writing assign-
ments, such as a trial or appellate brief. The professor would assign students a 
short, low-stakes writing assignment where the students would explore the ad-
vanced rhetorical concepts at play. The students would first identify the com-
ponents of the rhetorical situation for their briefs—the exigence, the audience, 
and the constraints, including an analysis of the artistic and inartistic proofs on 
which the students as rhetors will rely. The students would also identify ideas, 
assumptions, and texts that pop up in the case law and reflect the cultural and 
political contexts in which the relevant law arose and how changes to that con-
text might change which arguments and strategies work best before different 
courts at different times. 
 
160  Presumably every case presents the opportunity to discuss the rhetorical situation. 
161  A professor who plans to use a similar assignment year after year might create a short 
video lecture introducing the concepts. 
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Conducting this exercise when the students are thoroughly familiar with 
the facts and law at issue, but before they have written a full first draft of their 
legal argument, may help the students engage with the legal texts on a deeper 
and ultimately more effective level by encouraging them to recognize the im-
plicit assumptions and reasoning as well as the explicit facts, rationale, and 
holding. The exercise may also help the students formulate legal arguments that 
are ultimately deeper, more accurate, and more compelling. 
LRA professors should also seriously consider explicitly teaching students 
how to cite and discuss dissents effectively in written legal advocacy. If, in-
deed, many dissents ultimately become law—or at least influence the shape of 
the law in some way—certainly the wise advocate should be skilled in writing 
about them and using them as persuasive tools. One method for approaching 
this nicely dovetails with some practical research instruction: An LRA profes-
sor could select one of the well-known influential dissents—like Justice Har-
lan’s dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson,162 Justice Brandeis’s dissent in Olmstead v. 
United States,163 or Justice Stone’s dissent in Minersville School District v. Go-
bitis164—and then have the students use law-updating tools on legal research 
software to identify briefs that cite that dissent and trace the dissent’s influence 
through the ultimate court opinion. Once the students settle on briefs and opin-
ions to analyze, they could write a short paper analyzing the rhetorical situation 
and the techniques the brief writers used to deploy the dissent to their ad-
vantage. The students could also reflect on kairos—considering both why the 
dissent’s reasoning, which did not hold sway in the original opinion, was better 
timed when reasserted later, and why it was effective where and how it was 
used in a given brief. Of course, this exercise requires the LRA professor to do 
significant research and legwork at the outset to identify briefs that seem to use 
the dissent effectively and opinions influenced by the dissent, but it could be a 
powerful teaching tool and, of course, a way to explicitly explore rhetorical sit-
uations, rhetorical circulation, intertextuality, and kairos. 
V. DISSENT IMPLICATIONS 
Using dissents as a pedagogical tool for introducing law students to the 
complex rhetorical concepts of rhetorical situation, rhetorical circulation, inter-
textuality, and kairos has tremendous implications for legal education and for 
heightening law students’ understanding of the close relationship between law 
and rhetoric. Most notable among these implications is that thinking through 
the constitutive capacity of these rhetorical concepts positions law students to 
see and understand how meaning making and knowledge creation in law are 
not processes far removed from their lives. Instead they are processes available 
at their hands and ready to be leveraged to support both the kinds of work they 
 
162  Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
163  Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
164  Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 601 (1940) (Stone, J., dissenting). 
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want to perform as lawyers and the kinds of lives and identities they want to 
cultivate as professionals. Also, thinking about the connection between law and 
rhetoric in ways discussed in this Article raises important questions regarding 
the training of lawyers for the contemporary practice of law. 
First, we are interested in imagining lawyers as public citizens, individuals 
not just engaged in the traditional practice of law.165 Using dissent and rhetoric 
principles, can we shift law students’ imaginations about what it means to take 
on responsibilities of both client advocacy and public citizenship? What are the 
implications to legal writing pedagogy of teaching law students not just to write 
for the law but for social change? Is it appropriate to teach them to write for so-
cial change? 
Second, dissents expand understandings of lawyers as authors. Dissent 
pedagogy demonstrates that lawyers have authoring potential beyond just de-
veloping arguments in support of a client’s case. They are authors of rhetorical 
situations and of new intertextual articulations that create conditions for inno-
vating on the law. Ultimately, can broadening notions of authoring provide 
lawyers with agency and enable them to envision themselves as more than just 
passive conduits of predetermined outcomes? 
Third, so much controversy in law today is about the role of values in ar-
gumentation.166 However, “[e]xpressing the law is inescapably a process 
shaped by values.”167 Is it possible through dissent pedagogy to slow the exclu-
sion of values that law’s systematicity enacts and help students account for and 
embrace the rhetorical potential of values in legal argumentation? 
Fourth, as we move the meter toward public citizenship, new authoring 
roles, and values, can we more intentionally address lawyer well-being? Do nu-
anced understandings of rhetorical situation, rhetorical circulation, intertextu-
ality, and kairos developed through dissent pedagogy help students identify 
new pathways for cultivating more autonomy and developing sustainable con-
nections between their professional and personal lives? 
Explicitly addressing questions like these will help law students become 
better strategic thinkers and help them see their writing in a larger context of a 
case, of a litigation strategy, or of a larger movement of social change. Fur-
thermore, framing legal discourse in terms of the discussed complex rhetorical 
concepts might make it easier to have the difficult, inevitably political, and 
sometimes emotional conversations that arise when law is placed in the larger 
context in a less charged, safer way. 
 
165  For a discussion of the concept of lawyer as public citizen, see Robert W. Gordon, The 
Citizen Lawyer—A Brief Informal History of a Myth with Some Basis in Reality, 50 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1169, 1169 (2009); Irma S. Russell, The Lawyer as Public Citizen: Meeting 
the Pro Bono Challenge, 72 UMKC L. REV. 439, 439 (2003); Robert E. Scott, The Lawyer 
as Public Citizen, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 733, 733 (2000). 
166  For example, there is much criticism of originalism’s attempt to keep values out of legal 
argumentation and decision-making. See ERIC J. SEGALL, ORIGINALISM AS FAITH 3 (2018). 
167  Kirby, supra note 62, at 5; see also SEGALL, supra note 166, at 3. 
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Admittedly, the prospect of adding complex rhetorical concepts to law 
school curriculum may seem daunting. However, law faculty are already there. 
They are actively working to integrate rhetoric and note its relevance to law.168 
This Article presents dissent pedagogy as a kairotic opening before faculty. It is 
time to act in that opening and rearticulate dissent pedagogy as a necessary 
complement to the training of lawyers for the contemporary practice of law, 
which necessarily engages law, rhetoric, and politics. 
 
168  See sources cited supra notes 10, 21, 23, and 25–26. 
